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McCrosky v. Carson Tahoe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 115 (Dec. 28, 2017)1 
 




 The Court determined that vicarious liability is not abrogated by NRS 41A.045or by 
settling with one tortfeasor, unless the settlement so provides. Further, whether an ostensible 
agency exception exists is a question of fact that must be determined by the jury. Finally, after 
finding that federal law preempts NRS 42.021, the Court reverted to the per se rule in Nevada that 




After finding out she was pregnant, Tawni McCrosky visited Maternal Obstetrical 
Management (MOM’s) clinic, a prenatal care clinic operated by Carson Tahoe Reginal Medical 
Center (CTRMC). MOM’s clinic is staffed by nurses and physicians who volunteer their time. 
Each time McCorsky visited MOM’s, she signed a “Conditions of Admission” (COA), which 
stated “[all] independent contractors [] are NOT employees or agents of the hospital. I am advised 
that I will receive separate bills for these services. __ (Initial)”. McCrosky also signed and initialed 
a COA identical to the one above when she preregistered with CRTMC to deliver her baby at the 
hospital. 
Dr. Hayes was the obstetrician on call that delivered McCrosky’s baby. The delivery 
resulted in McCrosky’s child suffering permanent, debilitating injuries, and McCrosky sued Dr. 
Hayes and CTRCM alleging negligent care. Prior to trial, McCrosky settled with Dr. Hayes; 
however, they both signed a release that explicitly reserved “[a]ll rights against the hospital 
predicated upon the actions or omissions of Dr. Hayes”.  
In the suit against CTRMC, McCrosky alleged that CTRMC was directly negligent and 
vicariously liable for Dr. Hayes’s alleged negligence. The jury rejected the first issue. CTRMC 
moved for partial summary judgment on the second issue, and the district court granted the motion. 




The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability  
  
Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
  
 NRS 41A.045 does not abrogate vicarious liability  
  
The several liability statute (NRS 41A.045) provides that “in an action for injury or 
death…each defendant is liable to the plaintiff…severally only, and not jointly, for that portion of 
the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant”.2 This 
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statute substitutes a joint and several liability scheme, where each defendant is liable for all of the 
damages that all defendants caused, for a several liability scheme, where each defendant is 
responsible for his or her own share.3  
Vicarious liability is a distinct concept from several liability. Vicarious liability is 
“[l]iability that a supervisory party…bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate…based on 
the relationship between the two parties”4 and applies regardless of whether several and joint 
liability or several liability governs. Since the several liability statute is silent regarding vicarious 
liability, vicarious liability survives the scheme created by the statute.  
 
 Settling with Dr. Hayes did not extinguish vicarious liability claims against CTRMC 
 
The settlement statute (NRS 17.245) passed by the Nevada Legislature established that a 
settlement with one tortfeasor does not release others from liability, unless the settlement explicitly 
states so. The settlement with Dr. Hayes reserved all claims against the employer, therefore it does 
not extinguish CTRMC’s vicarious liability. This does not result in double recovery, because any 
damages recovered by the hospital will be reduced by the amount McCrosky received from the 
settlement.  
 
An issue of fact existed as to whether Dr. Hayes was an ostensible agent of CTRMC  
 
The general rule of vicarious liability is that an employer is liable for the negligence of its 
employee, not of an independent contractor. However, the doctrine of ostensible agency creates 
an exception if the hospital selects the doctor, and if it is reasonable to believe that the doctor is an 
agent of the hospital.5 This determination is a question of fact that must be left to the jury.6  
The district court erred in finding that the COA established as a matter of law that Dr. 
Hayes was an independent contractor. Although the COA states that physicians are independent 
contractors and not employees of the hospital, it is unclear whether a patient would understand this 
to mean that the hospital is not liable for the physician’s negligence. The COA highlights only the 
issue of billing and says nothing about liability. As such, the COA does not dispel the appearance 
of agency as a matter of law, and a material issue of fact exists as to whether an ostensible agency 
existed. 
 
The district court erred in allowing CRTMC to introduce evidence of collateral payments made 
on behalf of McCrosky  
 
Nevada has adopted a per se rule that bars admission of collateral source payments for any 
purpose. NRS 42.021(1) created an exception to this rule in medical malpractice cases, allowing 
defendants to introduce collateral payments from third parties, in order to prevent double dipping. 
The second part of the statute prohibits collateral sources from recovering directly from plaintiffs, 
in order to protect plaintiffs from having their awards overly diminished.  
However, 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) directly conflicts with NRS 42.021 because it allows the 
United States to recover Medicaid payments from a plaintiff who prevails in a medical malpractice 
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suit. Federal law governs when state and federal law conflict, therefore NRS 42.021(2) is 
preempted.7 Since severing NRS 42.021(2) from the statute would result in unintended 
consequences of doubly reducing the plaintiff’s recoveries, the entire statute must be stricken. The 
Court reverts to the per se rule in Nevada that collateral source payments may not be admitted into 
evidence. On remand, CTRMC cannot introduce Medicaid payments into evidence.  
 
McCrosky’s remaining claims of error are without merit 
 
First, there was no error in the district court’s decision to put Dr. Hayes’s name on the jury 
form, even though she was not a defendant in the case. Second, the jury’s verdict was not 
“manifestly and palpably contrary to evidence”, thus the jury’s verdict as to CTRMC’s negligence 




The district court’s order granting summary judgment is reversed. On remand, CTRMC 
may not introduce evidence of Medicaid payments because NRS 42.021 is preempted by federal 
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